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Criminal justice system delay, which is defined as the time elapsing between the defendant being 
charged and the case being listed at court, has up to some point, socially valuable flexibility value. 
This insight borrowed from the options literature in finance, makes it potentially possible to formally 
model and estimate socially optimal criminal justice system waiting times. This exercise is attempted 
in this paper by randomising the defendant’s probability of conviction, which is a critical argument in 
the defendant’s expected cost of going to trial and the monetary value of a conviction to society .The 
probability of conviction is assumed to conform to a uniform probability distribution with increasing 
variability until the trial date. What drives this variability is a continuous stream of information 
impacting on the defendant’s probability of conviction, which is continuously evaluated by the 
defendant and prosecutor as they formulate their different strategies given their respective conflicting 
objectives. Endogenising the probability of conviction in this way enables the respective payoffs of 
the defendant and prosecutor to be expressed as dynamic net present values per unit of time. The 
economic value of this flexibility to wait is measured as the rate of change in the sum of these 
dynamic NPVs per unit of time. Socially optimal delay is defined as the trial wait, which maximises 
the dollar value of the sum of the economic value of flexibility to the prosecutor (society) and the 
defendant simultaneously, and is the optimal time to list the case at the court.. The corresponding 
dollar value is the total marginal social value of delay. Corresponding to the socially optimal wait and 
the total marginal social value of delay will be the optimal sentence discount for the prosecutor 
(society) to offer the defendant and the defendant’s optimal plea. Society makes a trade off between 
two conflicting objectives, the need to ensure justice to the defendant as legally and morally defined 















1.  Introduction 
 
Gravelle (1990) has analysed the demand for civil trials by bringing delay explicitly into the analysis 
with the objective of showing that rationing by waiting (being placed on a court waiting list rather 
than standing in a queue) can increase social welfare. The author models the impact of court delay, 
which he defines as the time elapsing from the listing of the case until its determination, on both the 
parties’ pre and post dispute decisions. For example, prior to the accident resulting in a civil suit, the 
defendant would have made a decision about how much care to take in potentially risky situations so 
as to minimise the expected cost of any mishap. While strict rationality compels the defendant to 
consider the marginal damage and precaution costs in the care decision, aspects of the former such as 
likely compensation payable to an injured plaintiff and possible trial costs if litigation ensues, may 
well be underestimated if not ignored completely. Any inefficient decision by the potential defendant 
about the level of care to take will not be corrected by charging a higher price for a court trial because 
this decision is very much anterior to any court proceedings, and therefore cannot provide any 
incentive to consider the care decision more carefully. Court delay however can impact on the value 
of any likely defendant payout or court costs because for example, the probability of winning or 
losing changes with time and the time value of money declines. It follows that delay can be a benefit 
or a cost to society depending on its impact on the accident rate through care levels and the discounted 
cost of a trial.     
In this paper the focus is on criminal justice system delay, which is defined as the time elapsing 
between the defendant being charged and the listing of the case at the court. Up to some point this 
delay has a flexibility value. The charged defendant wants the lowest possible penalty (acquittal or a 
low sentence following a guilty plea), while the prosecutor wants the highest possible punishment 
consistent with the offence, and with justice as understood by the community being accorded to the 
victim and accused. The level of penalty depends on the defendant’s probability of conviction if a trial 
is sought or on the sentence discount if offered for a relatively early guilty plea. Before optimal 
decisions can be made by the prosecutor and defendant they need the maximum amount of 
information pertaining to the defendant’s guilt or innocence. However, relevant evidence comes in 
randomly and requires constant evaluation. Similarly irrelevant information has to be discarded. 
Delay then is essential as it gives both parties the option and flexibility of acting on better subsequent 
information.     
Criminal court delays  (initiation of the case to final disposition)  are considerable in Australia, 
although there is considerable variation between the states and disposition modes.. This can be seen 











                                                           
1 Later data cannot be provided because subsequent issues of this publication have discontinued providing 





    Criminal Court Delay. 
     Initiation to Verdict (weeks). 2000-01. 
                                                   NSW    Vic    Qld    SA    WA    Tas    NT    ACT    Aust 
 
Acquitted 
Mean time elapsed (weeks)        52.0     48.1     37.4     41.4    61.9    31.1   59.4    69.9     49.2 
Median time                                38.2     41.7     32.5     34.3    60.3    24.6   63.4   57.6      41.5 
 
Guilty Verdict 
Mean time                                    65.5    55.6     41.9     50.2   64.0    29.3    48.7    65.1    55.8 
Median time                                 52.3    51.1     34.9     40.1   63.1    23.0    42.8    53.3     49.3 
 
Guilty plea 
Mean time                                     30.8   26.3     24.4    24.7    17.7     16.5     20.3    30.9   24.6 
Median time                                  19.1   18.1     18.6    19.8    10.1     10.5     16.0     16.9  16.7 
 
Other finalisation 
Mean time                                      52.9   58.9    37.9    21.6    36.0      28.4    33.7    70.6   39.4 
Median time                                   30.6   41.3    28.4    14.2    27.1      20.9    26.6     67.1  27.0 
 
Total 
Mean time                                      39.6    32.5    28.4     28.0    30.0      21.8   24.4   45.5  31.4 
Median time                                   24.4    23.0    21.7     21.3    14.6      14.6   18.1   33.1  21.3 
 








These reported waiting times are the outcome of many decisions made by numerous participants in 
the criminal justice system, police, prosecutors, defendants, defendants’ lawyers, court administrators 
and judges. A relatively large literature reviewed in Torre (2008) emphasises the potential rationing 
function of these waiting times. In that paper the author shifted the analysis from rationing to benefits 
and costs of delay. Simple static NPV analysis in non continuous time was utilised to define the 
socially optimal amount of pre-trial delay for defendants not granted bail and an attempt was made to 
estimate the net social benefits yielded by these waits. It was argued that public perceptions including 
those of policy makers, should move away from always  exclusively  focussing on the costs to 
offenders of being held on remand, while ignoring any possible net gains to society from these 
arrangements. This paper is a further extension of this line of argument in which the option value of 
delay is analysed in a dynamic rather than a static framework in continuous time. Again this richer 
analysis leads to the conclusion that the focus on court waiting times (listing of the case until final 





(i)  Not on Bail: 
When a defendant is charged with an offence, the court may or may not grant bail. It is necessary to 
consider each of these cases separately since the value of the expected sentence cost following a trial 
differs. In both instances, the defendant is legally aided and risk neutral, which enables the expected 
cost payoff to be written in its simplest form. A lower bound estimate of the cost of imprisonment to 
the defendant is the foregone income during incarceration. The expected cost of a trial is given by          
E(C) = (Y, P, D, r, T)                                                                                                            (1) 
Where, P is the probability of being convicted following a trial, and T is the time elapsing from the 
time of remand until the conclusion of the trial.    
The static net present value of (ii) is : 
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Expression (2) is the static NPV because any decision made according to this algorithm is a once and 
for all decision. It does not capture the learning and responding and possibly strategic feature of the 
passing of time in the context of the criminal justice process because any future flexibility is ruled out. 
In order to convert (2) into a dynamic expression (dynamic NPV) P needs to be endogenised by 
                                                                                         (2) 
                                                           
2 All derivations are shown in an appendix to this paper. 6 
 
writing P as a function of T, P(T). This is done by assuming that P tracks a uniform probability 










                                                                                                                         (3) 
In (3) α is the defendant’s probability of conviction when the defendant is charged. As T increases, 
the range over which randomness can fluctuate also increases. For example, if α = 0.4 initially and T 
= o, the lower value of the distribution is 0.4 and the upper value is also 0.4. If T increases to 1, the 
lower value falls to 0.2 and the higher value increases to 0.7. 









































                                                                                                                      (4) 
Substituting E(P) in (4) into (2) yields: 
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                                                                      (5) 
Expression (5) measures dynamic not static net present value because unlike (2), as T changes so does 
P(T) due to information randomly arriving and being discarded, which enables the defendant and 
prosecutor, to continuously evaluate their respective options and strategies. The economic value of 
this flexibility can be measured as the change in dynamic NPV per unit of time. This is found by 
differentiating (5) with respect to T, which yields the following expression: 
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α                                                                     (6) 
The sign of (6) depends on the value of α the defendant’s probability of conviction at a trial. If α = 
0.5 then (6) is always an increasing positive number for T  ≥ 0; for values of α ≤ 0.5  it is always a 
declining positive number and for values of α  ≥ 0.5  it is initially a decreasing negative and then an 
increasing positive number. 
(ii)  On Bail: 
In the case of an on bail defendant there is no sentence backdating for time spent on remand if 
conviction and imprisonment ensues following a trial. Convicted on bail defendants are less likely to 
be imprisoned than their not on bail counterparts, therefore another probability is inserted into the 
expected cost of a trial expression, λ  which is the probability of imprisonment. The static NPV of a 
trial is given by (7): 7 
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                                                                                                       (7) 
Substituting P(T) into (7) yields the more useful dynamic version: 












                                                                                             (8) 
Differentiating (8) with respect to T gives the rate of change in dynamic NPV or the economic value 
of flexibility: 
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The sign of (9) depends on the value of α; if α  ≥ 0.5 then it is negative with the negative number 
becoming smaller for T ≥ 0 and if α < 0.5 it is positive with the positive number increasing for T ≥ 0. 
(b) Society 
An important function of punishment is to compensate society for the often substantial social cost of 
the crime. Social compensation proportional to the social loss from the offence will only be 
forthcoming if the defendant is convicted following a guilty plea or a trial and depends on the 
sentence length. It is assumed that the expected marginal social value of a conviction diminishes per 
unit of time. A functional form, which satisfies these properties, is given by:  
) (
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Where L is the social loss or cost of the offence and r is the social discount rate. Since P(T) this is a 
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                                                (12) 
Expression (12) gives the economic value of flexibility or court delay to society. 
For α ≥ 0.5 (12) is initially negative becomes positive reaches a maximum and then declines, for α < 
0.5 the expression is initially negative becomes positive reaches a maximum and then declines for T ≥ 
0. 
Socially optimal delay is defined as the trial wait, which maximises the value of the sum of (6) and 
(12) if the defendant is not on bail, and the sum of (9) and (12) if the defendant is on bail. Since each 
of the functions is a marginal relationship, each of these summations is called the total marginal social 
value of delay. The curve showing the relationship between trial delay and the total marginal social 
value of delay is typically shaped like an inverted parabola, initially increasing in T reaching a 
maximum value, and then decreasing in T. The one exception to this appears to be the not on bail case 
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111. Social Optimality 
(a) Simultaneous Equilibrium 
In figures 1 and 2 the socially optimal wait is denoted by T* and the corresponding total marginal 
social value of delay by $*. These need to be interpreted carefully. In addition to justice, society also 
wants a speedy resolution of the case, and is prepared to offer sentence discounts for early guilty 
pleas. The optimal wait T* then is the time when the prosecutor should offer a sentence discount and 
when the defendant should decide whether to accept it or reject it and go to trial. It also corresponds to 
the time when the case should be listed in the guilty plea or trial lists at the court, and is the social 
value of criminal justice delay. It is assumed not unrealistically that the defendant will choose 
between the two options, by comparing the cost of a guilty plea with the sentence discount with the 
expected cost of the trial. 
 
 Let the sentence discount D equal imprisonment in years  upon conviction following a trial M 
multiplied by the defendant’s foregone income while incarcerated Y minus the sentence following a 
guilty plea S and β = the maximum percentage sentence discount, so that S = βMY, in which case 
D = MY – S                                                                                                                       (13) 
Since at T = 
_
T (trial date allocated by the court), the sentence discount will be equal to zero, (13) can 
be rewritten as follows: 
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The information in figures 1, 2 and 3 and expressions (5) and (8) can now be brought together into 
one framework showing the simultaneous determination of the optimal wait, the social value of delay, 
the optimal sentence discount and the defendant’s optimal plea. For illustrative purposes let the value 
of α= 0.5 for both the not on bail and bail cases. Beginning with the not on bail case the following 
parameter values are used: Y = $10,000; r (defendant and social) = 0.05; L = $10,000;  0.5 α= ; D = 1 
year; M = 1 year;  0.2 β=  and 
_
T = 2 years. From the summation of expressions (6) and (12) the 
estimated optimal wait T* is 1 year. Using expression (14) the optimal sentence to offer the defendant 
at T* would result in a cost of $4,000 to the defendant. Finally, using expression (5) at T = 0 the 
dynamic NPV of a trial is $4877 > $4,000, which means that for all T until 
_
Tthe offered sentence 
discount is the cheaper option, therefore a guilty plea is the optimal choice .The optimal time to plead 
guilty and list the case at the court is one year after the defendant has been charged. This solution is 
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  Figure  3: Sentence Discount 
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In the bail case the assumed parameter values are: y = $10,000; r = 0.05 (defendant and social); 
0.5 α = ;  0.3 λ = ; D = 1 year; L = $10,000; M = 1 year;  0.2 β=  and 
_
T = 2 years. From the 
summation of expressions (9) and (12) the estimated optimal wait T* is 1 year.. Using expression (14) 
the optimal sentence to offer the defendant at T* would result in a cost of $4,000 to the defendant. 
Finally, using expression (8) at T = 0 the dynamic NPV of a trial is $1463 < $4,000, which means that 
for all T until 
_
T, the trial is the cheaper option, therefore a not guilty plea is the optimal choice .The 
optimal time to plead not guilty and list the case for trial is 1.4 years after the defendant has been 



















(b) Comparative Statics 
From a policy perspective, it is useful to assess the impact of changes in each of the values of the 
parameters in the model on the optimal T*. Preliminary work using the parameter values used to 
T
      T   T* = 1 year 
D* = $4,000 
   T 
D* = $4,000 
E(C)   5 . 0 = α  
NGP 
    Figure  5 13 
 
construct figures 4 and 5 reveal that for both the not on bail and on bail cases, the optimal value of T* 
is most sensitive to changes in the value of α the probability of conviction .In the simulation exercise 
beginning with the initial values outlined above and then increasing α from 0.5 to 0.8, and holding 
everything else constant while only increasing T, increased T* from 1 year to 2.2 years and 1.5 years 
respectively for the no bail and on bail cases. Increases in income from $10,000 to $20,000 reduced 
T* from 1 to 0.9 years in both cases, while increases in the defendant and social discount rates from 
0.05 to 0.10 reduced T* from 1 to 0.9 years and 0.8 years respectively for the on and no bail cases. 
Increases in the sentence after a trial from 1 to 2 years lowered T* from 1 to 0.9 years for both 
categories of defendant, and similarly, increases in the social loss of the offence from $10,000 to 
$20,000 lowered T* from 1 to 0.9 years in both instances. Finally an increase in the probability of 
imprisonment following conviction after a trial for an on bail defendant from 0.3 to 0.5 lowers T* 
from 1 to 0.9 years.   
 
1V. Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
Further analysis of criminal court waiting times suggests again that a distinction should be made 
between delay elapsing from the laying of charges until the listing of the case at the court and the 
listing of the case until final disposition by a guilty plea or a trial. The latter time period is probably 
more relevant in considering the internal operation of the courts as an economic organisation. Only 
the former time period is considered here and by explicitly modelling the probability of conviction as 
a stochastic variable, and utilising dynamic rather than static net present value as an analytical tool, it 
has been possible to theoretically redefine the concept of a socially optimal wait for the problem at 
hand. The framework is applicable to all defendants not on bail and those on bail. In this instance the 
theoretical specification of the relevant wait is not immediately obvious a priori. 
 
As well as optimum waits, the study’s methodology is useful for placing a dollar value on waiting 
time and illustrates the circumstances under which it is likely to be a benefit or a cost. This 
information is potentially an important input into cost benefit studies of the criminal justice system.  
The methodology can also be carried over to civil disputes. Empirical studies are now required to 
accompany this work, which is the next step in this research programme. The analytical technique 
adopted here may well allow the utilisation of an innovative approach to the empirics, namely option 
pricing models rather than standard econometric or simulation methods. The empirics pose some 
challenges, in particular valuing the social losses associated with different offences and the issue of 









ABS (2000-01) Higher Criminal Courts. Catalogue Number 4513.0 
Gravelle, H.S (1990) “Rationing Trials By waiting: Welfare Implications” International Review of 
Law and Economics, 10. Pp. 255-70. 
Torre, A (2008) Socially Optimal Criminal Court Waiting Times: A Partial Investigation, Australian 


























Static NPV of the expected cost of a trial to the defendant: (Not on Bail) 
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Static NPV of the expected cost of a trial to the defendant: (On bail) 
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 Dynamic NPV of the expected cost of a trial to the defendant: (On bail) 














Economic value of flexibility: (On bail) 
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Expected value of a conviction to society: 
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Economic value of flexibility or an option to society: 
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